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Spaces of the Religious Economy: Negotiating the
Regulation of Religious Space in Singapore
ORLANDO WOODS
School of Social Sciences
Singapore Management University
Over the past three decades, the theory of religious economy has been established, applied, debated, developed,
and rejected. It has proven to be as divisive as any "general theory" of religion should be, and yet its core tenets
continue to engage and unite scholars around the world. In response to broader shifts within the sociology of
religion, this article reframes religious economy by advancing a spatial approach to its theorization. A spatial
approach can help develop new perspectives on the regulation of religion, and the resistant agency of religious
groups. With a focus on the "secular monopoly" of Singapore, it demonstrates how the restricted supply of land
for religious purposes increases competition between religious groups. To overcome restrictions, religious groups
pursue strategies of spatial and organizational boundary crossing. This has led to the closer regulation of space,
and highlights the recursive interplay between the regulation and praxis of religion in Singapore.
Keywords: religious economy, space, regulation, secular monopoly, Christianity, Singapore.
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed the sociology of religion undergoing a period of profound self-
reflection. As the legitimacy of the subdiscipline has been reasserted, its theoretical underpinnings
have been critically interrogated, leading to fundamental changes in how religion is studied and
understood (Cadge, Levitt, and Smilde 2011; Cornwall 2011; Edgell 2012; Markofski 2015;
see also Berger 1999; Smith 2008). In particular, the longstanding dominance of secularization
theory has given way to more variegated understandings of religious growth and decline as a
result of organizational vitality and competitiveness (Finke and Stark 1988; Warner 1993), secular
modernity (Smith 2008), and postsecularism (Habermas 2008). More recently, the subdiscipline
has been invigorated by exploration of the quotidian praxis of religion (Ammerman 2006; see
also Kong and Woods 2018a), and a nascent concern with the role of religion in (re)producing
structures of power and inequality. It has also benefitted from concerted efforts to rebalance
the longstanding focus on American and European contexts, and to incorporate learnings from
other countries as well. These developments have resulted in a shift away from the universalizing
principles of a “general theory” of religion, and an embrace of more contextually nuanced
approaches to the sociology of religion instead.
This shift has wide-ranging ramifications for existing discourses. A growing sense of
dissatisfaction with “market and secularization approaches to religion, and with the debate
between them” (Edgell 2012:248; after Casanova 2001) has yielded an expansion of scope “away
from dominant geographic and religious locations, contexts and identities and toward more
marginalized, peripheral, and edge contexts, locations and practices” (Markofski 2015:460; after
Bender et al. 2012; Cadge, Levitt, and Smilde 2011; Kniss 2014). As much as the reshaping of the
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subdiscipline reflects the theoretical impasse that has long stifled its development, it also recog-
nizes the transformative potential of new, more innovative ideas. This has resulted in a “promising
new body of work” (Edgell 2012:248) that meshes the marginal with the dominant, cultural sys-
tems with religious markets, and existing understandings with new perspectives. This article con-
tributes to this body of work by advancing a spatial approach to religious economy theorization.
To date, religious economy theorists have engaged with space in a contextual sense by applying
different theoretical tenets to different empirical contexts in a bid to evaluate the robustness of
its core premises, and to develop them further (e.g., Stark 1998; Stark and Finke 2004; Stark,
Finke, and Iannaccone 1995). Notwithstanding the importance of such contextualization, I argue
that space is not just a mirror, but can help to determine the ways in which a religious economy
works as well.
My interest in religious economy stems from the enduring tension between theory in its
abstract and applied forms. While the principles of religious economy provide a valuable frame-
work for explaining religious change across space and time (as shown, for example, by Finke and
Iannaccone 1993; Finke and Stark 1988, 1989, 1992; Stark and Bainbridge 1987), they have also
proven to be pliable across the same axes of analysis (see Froese 2004a, 2004b; Woods 2012a;
Yang 2006, 2010). The theory appeals in its abstract form, but often needs to be adapted if it is to
avoid the neutering effects of application. As “a cause, a conduit and an effect” (Kong and Woods
2016:2) of the religious economy, space mediates the application of the theory, and can help to
determine its explanatory potential. Thus, in a bid to reconcile the tension between theory and
praxis, I propose that an exploration of the spaces of the religious economy will help to formulate
new theoretical derivatives that are unique—and relevant—to different empirical contexts around
the world, and that have an applied relevance to planners and urban policymakers as well (after
Luz 2015). Doing so will promote more interdisciplinary collaboration and dialog, and will help
mitigate against the problem of parochialism within the social scientific study of religion (after
Cornwall 2011; Poulson 2011).
Exploring the agentic role of space will lead to more sensitive interpretations of how a
religious economy is structured, and how it works. As an analytical lens, space gives “religion a
visible and material presence” and therefore “makes religion tangible” (Kong and Woods 2016:2;
see also Woods 2017). Building on these ideas, I define space as both a medium through which
religion is presented to society, and a resource that religious groups compete for. As medium,
space reveals the physical presence of religion, although, importantly, space does not refer just
to formally designated religious places (as shown by the presence of religious buildings, shrines,
and symbols), but also the more informal presence of religion in ostensibly nonreligious places.
Space therefore provides a lens through which the informal presence of religion can be analyzed,
which, in turn, means that it can provide an indication of the (in)efficacy of religious regulation
and the extent of religious competition. As resource, space both reflects the ordering of a religious
economy (with monopolistic religions having a bigger and more symbolic spatial presence, for
example) and informs the ways in which it works. In light of this, spatial perspectives have long
been advocated for “offer[ing] a more profound challenge to our theorizing than we now know”
(Williams 2005:241), with recognition of their value to the sociology of religion growing over
the past decade.1
Split into three sections, this article tracks the evolution of religious economy theorization,
and charts a path for its future. I start by outlining the normative approaches to religious economy
developed in the United States, and how such approaches have been expanded to suit differ-
ent contexts around the world. I then outline in detail how spatial sensitivity can lead to new
engagements with the theory of religious economy. The second and third sections thus provide
1In 2005, the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion held a forum on “Religion and Place” (volume 44, issue 3),
which heralded the prominence of place (and, more generally, space) within the subdiscipline.
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a counterpoint to normative approaches by demonstrating how religious persistence is not just a
“rational economic response to changes in the political, ecological and economic environments”
(Iyer et al. 2011:3) in which religious groups operate, but to spatial constraints as well. Through
an analysis of how religious groups operate within the secular monopoly of Singapore, I demon-
strate how space is an important mechanism through which religious marketplaces are ordered
and subverted. I conclude by proposing three avenues for further investigation.
THE THEORY OF RELIGIOUS ECONOMY: EXPANSIONS AND VARIEGATIONS
Religious economy has proven to be a remarkably malleable theory. It has a set of core
principles enshrined in a “normative” approach, with scholarship engaging with such principles
in two ways: by rejecting them and by expanding them. While the rejectionist standpoint is based
on the premise that “sociological explanation for such a broad phenomenon as religion over such
a broad range of countries is impossible” (Bruce 1999:115), the expansionist standpoint is more
aligned with the spirit of the discourse in its embryonic form, which was based on openness
to “improvements and friendly amendments” in the pursuit of “clear and rigorous theories of
religion” (Stark and Bainbridge 1987:53; see also Stark, Finke, and Iannaccone 1995). Below, I
examine these two standpoints in more detail. First, I outline the normative approach to religious
economy theorization, and its evolution as a theoretical counterpoint to secularization. Second, I
track its expansions and variegations in response to different applications around the world.
The American Model as Normative
The normative approach to religious economy theorization has been cast as a distinctly
American paradigm (after Warner 1993), which emerged in response to, and as distinct from,
European models of secularization. This distinction helped to identify the principles upon which
such an approach is based—namely, religious regulation, interreligious competition, and individ-
ual religiosity—and how these principles work together to explain the growth and/or decline of
religious groups. The core premise of the normative approach is:
To the extent that pluralism or regulation are adequate inferential measures of competition, the overall level of
religiousness will be higher where pluralism is greater or where regulation is lower. (Stark and Finke 2000:297)
Simply put, religious economies are either regulated and monopolistic or deregulated and
competitive: they cannot be both. The regulation of religion is therefore believed to determine
the growth and decline of religious groups over time and space. According to such a logic,
“regulation and deregulation play fundamental roles in determining market dynamics” (Woods
2012a:205), with regulation causing religious groups to be less competitive, and deregulation
(or a “free market”) causing them to be more competitive. This dynamic has been validated by
extensive application to the American and (Western) European contexts.
Specifically, the normative approach theorizes how the deregulation of religion in the United
States in the 18th and 19th centuries brought about a surge in religious activity, which, in
turn, resulted in a more competitive and pluralistic marketplace (see Finke 1990; Finke and
Stark 1992; Stark and Bainbridge 1985). Further evidence to support the normative approach
was found in parts of Europe, where the opposite dynamic was observed; that is, interreli-
gious competition and overall levels of religiosity were suppressed by the presence of highly
regulated, monopolistic religious marketplaces (see Stark and Bainbridge 1987; Stark and Ian-
naccone 1994). Latterly, the premises of the normative approach have been scrutinized in light
of recent evidence that has revealed a situation of religious variability—rather than outright
decline—throughout Europe. It has also been subject to increasingly vociferous opposition by
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secularization theorists, who argue that modernization (not regulation) is the driving force behind
the decline in religiosity (see Bruce 1999, 2000). Altogether, this has led to a rejection of the
normative approach by some, but to more collaborative forms of engagement and expansion by
others.
As the theory has expanded beyond the confines of the normative approach, so too has its
geographical purview. The normative approach was formed and validated in the United States. Its
application to the religious markets of (Western) Europe led to polarization in the form of further
validation and/or rejection. In turn, this gave way to more expansion-focused forms of application
in (Eastern) Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Asia. This expanding optic has given rise to
new theoretical directions (see Finke 2013), many of which take the agency of marginal religious
groups as a point of departure.
Recent Developments and the Global Optic
Applying the normative approach to different contexts around the world has led to the for-
mulation of new theoretical derivatives. These derivatives are a response to two assumptions
that underpin the normative approach. The first is that all religious groups are formally recog-
nized, and therefore operate in an open and transparent way. A clear reflection of the American
frame within which the theory was developed—wherein “no governmental permission is needed
to open a church” (Pfeffer 1974:9) or register a religious group—the assumption is that “un-
official” religions do not exist, meaning all religions are technically “official.” This does not,
however, account for the fact that “all societies have noninstitutionalized religious beliefs and
practices” (Yang 2006:94; see also Kong and Woods 2018a) that may be informal and ad hoc, but
are nonetheless important manifestations of religion and religiosity, especially in non-Western
contexts.2 Reflecting this reality, Yang (2006) has demarcated China’s religious marketplace ac-
cording to a tripartite structure of sanctioned religions (the red market), banned religions (the
black market), and religions with ambiguous legal/illegal status (the gray market).
The second builds on the first, and is based on the assumption that religious regulation
causes regulated groups to behave in a prescribed way. Specifically, the view that (de)regulation
does not necessarily lead to religious demise, but complication instead, has been demonstrated
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Chaves and Gorski 2001; Froese and Pfaff
2001), China (Yang 2006, 2010), Malaysia (Lee 1994), India (Iyer et al. 2011), Sri Lanka (Woods
2012a), and when variance in religiosity maps onto the state regulation of religion at a global
level (Grim and Finke 2007; North and Gwin 2004; see also Olson 1999 and Diotallevi 2002 for
subnational analyses). Often, the fact that religious minorities respond to regulation in ways that
are innovative, subversive, and often not the intended outcome of regulation has brought about
a “nascent shift . . . towards addressing informality” (Woods 2012a:216) in religious economy
discourse. Informal religious practice leads to a more relative interpretation of the regulatory
power of the state, which in itself is a source of interreligious (and religion-state) competition
and conflict in many contexts around the world. Indeed, while such outcomes can be seen as
the contextual effects of a religious economy, they are materialized through the construction and
contestation of space.
The workings of a religious economy need to be reinterpreted in ways that embrace, but
also transcend, the idiosyncrasies of context. Doing so will help to move the discourse beyond
contextual parochialism, and will contribute to a more fundamental reframing of it instead.
Reframing can be brought about through an analysis of space. As an analytical lens, space needs
to be embraced for its full explorative and explanatory potential. A spatial approach can lead
to more nuanced understandings of the relationship between the regulation of religion and the
2These include shamans, oracles, gurus, sadhus, and other nonrecognized forms of religion.
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competitiveness of religious groups, and can thus look beyond the deterministic underpinnings
of the normative model. It can also open up new ways of understanding how the regulation of
religion is enacted through space, and how the spatially defined practices of religious groups
can enable new forms of competitiveness to manifest. To date, religious economists have treated
space in descriptive terms. For example, urban environments have been interpreted as sampling
or “ecological” units (see Chaves and Gorski 2001; Finke and Stark 1989; Lawson and Cragun
2012; Wang and Yang 2006), or otherwise dismissed as “contextual effects” (Stark and Finke
2004:294). Far from being a passive backdrop to religious praxis, the active and agentic role of
space needs to be embraced. Doing so will reveal how it can lead to the (re)production of both
hegemonic and emancipatory religious practices, and can open up new theoretical perspectives.
SPACES OF THE RELIGIOUS ECONOMY: A NEW PERSPECTIVE
Space helps to materialize religion; it also creates opportunities for expressions of religious
power and resistance. Religious economy models are built on the premise that religious groups
compete for resources (see Finke, Martin, and Fox 2017), and space is one of the most contested
yet understudied proxies for religious presence (Kong and Woods 2016). Space is agentic, and
can both signify and hide religious presence. Not only that, but through constructions of space,
religious beings—whether groups or individuals—have the “freedom to move, whether physically,
socially, or inwardly” (Roof 1993:156; after Lefebvre 1991). Space can therefore be empowering.
It enables religious minorities to compete for presence and viability, and religious majorities to
wield their dominance. Throughout the world, the regulation of space is a key way in which
religious freedoms are denied; it is an important mechanism through which religious marketplaces
are ordered and subverted. Space can also enable more contextually nuanced understandings of
religious economy that are sensitive to religious power structures, both latent and manifest (after
Edgell 2012; Woods 2012a, 2018a, 2018b). In doing so, it provides recourse to many of the
critiques linked to economic theorizing; specifically, its asocial treatment of religious choice
(Edgell 2005; Iyer et al. 2011; Young 1997), the cultural dimensions of rationality (Smilde 2007),
how power works in and through religious organizations (Wilde et al. 2010), and its theoretical
indenture to the orthodoxies of Christian America (Bruce 1999; Cadge, Levitt, and Smilde 2011).
Space also speaks directly to the two assumptions embedded with the normative approach outlined
above.
The privileging of formal religions and the prescriptive efficacy of regulation have clear,
and well-documented, spatial manifestations. In other words, the factors that have limited the
discourse also provide the key to unlocking its more wide-ranging theoretical potential. Space
is one of the foremost regulatory tools used to control the actions of religious groups; it also
provides a strategy that enables the emancipation, survival, and sometimes even the growth of
such groups. Put differently, space is a medium through which regulatory power is applied, tested,
and challenged in a religious economy. Each of these ideas is now explained.
Regulation of Religion Through Space
Religious legitimacy and expressions of power—the building blocks of a religious
monopoly—are materialized in the public domain. Dominant religious groups make physical
claims to territory through buildings and shrines, and symbolic claims through presence in the
media, the education system, public holidays, and so on. In many Christian contexts, churches
(once) form(ed) territorially defined monopolies that demarcated space into “parishes” (Finke
and Iannaccone 1993). All these manifestations coalesce to inform and control the public re-
ligious consciousness. Control of public space is therefore one of the foremost ways in which
dominant religious groups can defend their status and place minorities at a disadvantage. Just as
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the workings of a religious economy are dictated by the type and strength of religious regulation,
the importance of space is underwritten by the praxis of regulation.
For example, the imposition of communist rule throughout Russia and China (and beyond)
has been well documented and debated by religious economy theorists, as it provides a clearly
demarcated example of the efficacy of religious regulation. State-sponsored atheism resulted
in the seizing and razing of religious buildings in a bid to “determine the fate and use of all
churches, mosques and synagogues” (Froese 2004a:41; Yang 2006, 2010; see also Chen 2017;
Finke, Martin, and Fox 2017). Control of public (religious) space was also shown to extend not
only to its ownership and management, but also its symbolic power. The Petersburg Cathedral of
Our Lady of Kazan was converted into the Museum of the History of Religion and Atheism in
Soviet Russia, and “the Revolutionary Square metro station in central Moscow was constructed
from the stones of the Danilov monastery” (Epstein 1995:181; see also Woods 2012b). This
reflects not only the atheistic control of the public domain, but also the active desacralization of
what came before to signify a break with the religious past.
Spatial regulation can be involved in prohibition as much as it is transformation. The pres-
ence of religious groups is controlled and managed through the granting of permission for the
construction, appropriation, or use of buildings for religious purposes, as well as the limits of
expression within the public or civic domains. In China, for example, not only is official approval
for religious buildings notoriously difficult to obtain, but also “officially approved churches and
ministers are not even allowed to proselytize beyond their religious premises” (Yang 2005: 430),
forcing religion out of public space and into more informal forms of expression instead. In some
contexts, civil society can play a more important role in regulating religion than the formal work-
ings of the state (Grim 2014; Grim and Finke 2007; Woods 2012a, 2018a). The social regulation
of public space can often take the form of persecution and violence against religious buildings as
symbols of otherness, with marginal groups often finding emancipation in private spaces (Woods
2013a).
Resistance to Regulation Through Space
While the regulation of space can be seen as an effect of the religious economy—essentially
an assertion of monopolistic power—it can also be a determinant of how it is (re)structured.
Marginal (often unrecognized) religious groups that are regulated out of the public domain find
accommodation and empowerment in more privatized or informal practices and spaces instead.
During the Cultural Revolution in China, for example, “religion disappeared only from the public
scene,” while “many people maintain[ed] their faith in secrecy” (Yang 2006:102, emphasis added;
see also Woods 2012a, 2013a, 2013b; Yang 2010). This leads to the creation and protection of
autonomous religious niches that exist in contradistinction to the regulatory environment. Put
another way, the spatial variability of religious regulation causes religious expression and praxis
to respond in kind, with there being multiple, often overlapping, forms of religious economy
operating within a given territory. Regulation rarely prevents religious praxis; it simply alters the
terms of engagement.
Space can, as such, be a strategy used to defy regulation. It enables marginal religious groups
to “find new niches under the radar of repression” (Froese 2004b:73) and to therefore “persist
regardless of the severity of suppression” (Yang 2010:202). As such, the agency of space can
mediate the efficacy of regulation. In China, despite the fact that the propagation and preaching of
religion outside of buildings that are officially sanctioned for religious use is outlawed, religious
groups continue to operate through private and other ostensibly secular spaces. Specifically, Yang
(2005:437) identifies McDonald’s as a space of emancipation for Christians. As he explains:
The attraction of McDonald’s appears to be its culture more than the food: it offers a private space at a table in a
public space at the restaurant. It is an accessible and acceptable public place to meet a stranger without exposing
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one’s home or office. Meanwhile, as soon as two or more people sit at a table with a drink or a packaged meal,
the table instantly becomes private until they leave. No other customers should invade this space. That was why
clandestine Timothy Training Courses3 and small group Bible study sessions favoured McDonald’s as a gathering
place. It was noisy. But the noisiness itself seemed to be a layer of protection—we did not need to worry about
listening ears at nearby tables.
This example is instructive in various ways. It shows how space is an outcome of ongoing
processes of (re)construction, and can morph from being public to private and back to public
again in response to the purpose it serves. It shows how the punitive regulation of religion in
China has not only failed to curb the spatial emancipation of Christians, but actually encouraged
the subversive appropriation of a (public) secular space for religious purposes. Finally, it shows
how such regulation can actually strengthen religion by enforcing associations with Western
modernity, and therefore, difference from the sociocultural habitus of China. McDonald’s is a
space of global modernity that encapsulates everything that Christianity has to offer potential
Chinese converts: “to the young and educated Chinese who are consciously seeking modernity
and integration with the rest of the world, McDonald’s appears to share similar characteristics of
modernity and cosmopolitanism” (Yang 2005:425; see also Yan 1997). Creating and exploiting
categories of difference through strategies of spatial emancipation is also seen in communist
Eastern Europe, where churches became “free social spaces” (Froese and Pfaff 2001:485) that
enabled the fomentation of nationalist resistance to communism. In this case, the freedom of
the church juxtaposed the proscriptions of public space, enabling both religious and political
resistance.
Having identified how existing scholarship on the religious economy maps onto space, I
now validate these observations through an empirical examination of the spaces of Singapore’s
religious economy. Specifically, I show how the limited supply of space, coupled with the close
regulation of space for religious purposes, has resulted in religious groups competing with each
other—and with other, nonreligious groups—for space. Competition for space is thus an important
determinant of religious praxis in Singapore, the effects of which have shaped both organizational
strategy and regulatory response.
NEGOTIATING RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGIOUS SPACE IN SINGAPORE
Singapore is an island city-state with a population that is predominantly religious, and diverse
in its religiosity. In 2015, the resident population of 3.9 million comprised Buddhists/Taoists
(43.2 percent), Christians (18.8 percent, including Catholics), Muslims (14.0 percent), Hindus
(5.0 percent), and other religions (.6 percent); only 18.5 percent declared no religion (Statistics
Singapore 2015). Such heterogeneity has caused the state to adopt a secular position (Kong 1993;
Tan 2008), which, in turn, has caused widespread acceptance of the “hegemony of the state in
framing collective goals and imposing its ideological narrative from the top” (Kong and Woods
2016:109; see also Kong and Woods 2018b). I thus theorize Singapore’s religious marketplace
as a “secular monopoly,” whereby an authoritarian (and secular) state does not privilege any
one religious group, but seeks to treat all recognized religions fairly and equally. My use of
secular monopoly is distinct from secularization, as I seek not only to explain the absence or
presence of religion, but also to understand the restrictions on religion that are enforced by a
secular state (after Finke 2013). The limits of religious expression are therefore controlled through
regulation, the aim being to protect against the encroachment of religion into the secular spaces
of government and public life, and also to protect religious groups from intergroup competition
that could negatively impact religious harmony (The Straits Times 04.02.16). This is important,
3The Timothy Training Course is a series of lessons commonly used for Christian evangelism and discipleship in China.
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as such limitations serve to minimize competition between groups representing different religions
(and, indeed, between religious and nonreligious groups), but to increase competition between
groups of the same religion. Accordingly, regulation dictates that religious groups engage in
intrareligious forms of competition for space, the untenability of which has caused some to
explore alternative strategies of spatial acquisition instead.
Since gaining independence in 1965, Singapore has experienced rapid economic develop-
ment. This, combined with its limited size,4 has placed great pressures on the allocation of land.
Such pressures have increased in recent decades, as the state has released less new land for
religious purposes, and has also retracted some religious land to meet the growing need for public
infrastructure (Kong and Woods 2016). As a result, the fact that the demand for religious land
vastly outstrips its supply renders the Singapore case unique and instructive to the advancement
of religious economy theory. When interpreted from a spatial perspective, the close and strict
regulation of land—especially that used for religious purposes—has served to restrict the supply
and thus increase the demand (and, by extension, the competition) for space. This complicates
the normative model of religious economy, which states that regulation suppresses competition.
More than that, such a strict regulatory context also serves to “deny the meaningfulness of re-
ligious buildings to ordinary individuals” as the government treats religious buildings “as no
different from other buildings” (Kong 1993:41), irrespective of the meanings attached to them
by religious groups and individuals. As a medium through which religion is presented to society,
Singapore’s religious spaces are often therefore more functional than they are sacred, and more
impermanent than they are permanent. The government tends to treat religious spaces in much
the same way as it does other spaces; that is, in transactional terms, and often subordinate to
the planning requirements of the national development agenda. In turn, these characteristics have
come to shape the place-bound experience and practice of religion in Singapore.
In order to illustrate the dynamics described above, the empirical subsections that follow
draw on a qualitative analysis of issues reported in Singapore’s foremost media outlet, The Straits
Times. While there are several English-language media outlets in Singapore,5 The Straits Times
is the most comprehensive in its coverage of domestic affairs. Moreover, being owned by the
government-linked Singapore Press Holdings, it is the only media outlet to cover regulation- and
policy-related issues in detail. I used the Factiva database to search the archives of The Straits
Times for articles related to religion and land/space (140 articles), and those related to religion
and the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) (21 articles). The results were then deduplicated,
read, and manually coded for themes. I focused on tracking the shifting regulatory landscape over
time, and the responses of those religious groups most affected by such shifts. I then conducted
more specific searches for information on particular events and organizations of interest. Much
of the ensuing analysis relates to Christian groups. This reflects the rapid growth and competitive
dynamism of these groups in recent decades, which has caused them to feature most prominently
in public discourses regarding the acquisition and use of both religious and ostensibly nonreligious
spaces for religious purposes. In contrast, Muslim and Hindu groups have received considerably
less coverage. This is because their growth has either been minimal or negative, which has caused
their spatial requirements to be relatively unchanging. The articles cited below are from 2007 to
2016, the period when the proliferation (and spatial expansion) of Christian groups started to be
noticed, and thus reported on.
The three subsections that follow explore how Christian groups (in particular, I also consider
the strategic responses of some Buddhist/Taoist groups to regulation as well) respond to the
restrictions on religious space in Singapore. First, I provide an overview of how the state regulates
4Singapore’s land area is approximately 720 km2.
5Other English-language newspapers include The Business Times, The New Paper, and Today. Other newspapers include
the Chinese-language Lianhe Zaobao and Lianhe Waobao, and the Malay-language Berita Harian.
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the supply of religious land in Singapore, and then examine how religious groups pursue strategies
of spatial and organization boundary crossing in response. Specifically, I show how such strategies
are often based on a tradeoff between cost and capacity, both of which are affected by regulation
and broader (secular) market forces.
Regulating the Supply of Religious Land in Singapore
The laws that regulate the zoning of land in Singapore are stringent. Since the passing of
the Land Acquisition Act in 1966, a process of compulsory land acquisition resulted in state
ownership of approximately 85 percent of Singapore’s landmass (Kong 1993). This means that
the formal religious landscape of Singapore is one that is closely regulated by the government.
The exertion of “exact control and influence over the city’s urban landscape—from land use and
zoning, to design and aesthetics” has caused the state to be a “direct and monopolistic player in the
country’s public and private real estate markets” (Woods and Kong 2017:209). These dynamics
set Singapore apart from other urban contexts, and reveal the hegemonic influence of the state
in shaping the terms of competition for space. The URA allocates parcels of land for places of
worship in its master plan; the parcels are then assigned to different religious groups and auctioned
off in closed bids (see Heng 2016; Kong 1993). Allocation is based on consideration of population
growth, the distribution of existing places of worship, ease of access for the community, and the
potential impact on the surrounding area. The price of the land differs by group, which itself is a
measure to protect religion from the effects of market forces privileging better funded religions
over others. Accordingly, between 2000 and 2010, land for Christian churches cost 50 percent
more per square meter than Buddhist/Taoist temple land, whereas land for mosques was typically
sold three to four times below market value (The Straits Times 13.06.10b). While this system is
designed to “safeguard the amenity of certain locations” and “provide certainty and transparency
on land use” (URA cited in The Straits Times 13.06.10a), it has failed to match the demand for
land by the fastest-growing religious groups in Singapore.
The restricted supply of land for religious purposes has had the biggest impact on Christian
groups, which have grown in both number (i.e., more churches) and size (i.e., larger churches)
in recent decades. Between 2000 and 2010, the size of the Christian population nearly doubled,6
from 588,000 to 930,000 (The Straits Times 23.02.15). Despite such growth, only two new plots
of church land were released for bidding between 2005 and 2010; a problem further aggravated
by shrinking average plot sizes—from 4,617 m2 in 1995, to less than 3,000 m2 over the period
2000–2010—and a shortening of leases from 60 to 30 years (The Straits Times 13.06.10b).
Given that a 3,000 m2 plot of land can house an auditorium for approximately 1,000 people, the
land that is being supplied to accommodate the growth of Christianity in Singapore is too small
for many larger churches, and too expensive for most smaller ones. Thus, churches with their
own land are forced to accommodate growing congregations on (often) inadequately sized plots,
while churches without land are forced to find space to worship outside the formal allocations
of the master plan. Put differently, the fierce—and, for most churches, prohibitively expensive—
competition for church land has caused many Christian groups to pursue more informal strategies
of spatial appropriation that, for many years, have existed outside the boundaries of government
regulation (see Kong 1993, 2002; Tan 2008). In more abstract terms, while the regulation of space
is designed to contain the physical spread of Christian groups, it has instead led to innovative
(and unforeseen) forms of competitive response. These responses include strategies of spatial
and organizational boundary crossing, which, in turn, have evoked regulatory responses from the
6In contrast, between 2000 and 2010, the Hindu population only increased from 4.0 to 5.1 percent, while the Muslim and
Buddhist/Taoist populations decreased from 14.9 to 14.7 percent and from 51.0 to 44.2 percent, respectively (SingStat
2010).
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government. This has resulted in both a formalization of regulation over time and a recursive
interplay between spatial regulation and praxis.
Strategies of Spatial Boundary Crossing
While existing understandings of religious economy tend to view both boundaries—between
religions and between the religious and the secular—and regulation as fixed and unchanging,
the Singapore case reveals the fluidity of religion in response to regulation, and the evolving
regulatory landscape in response to such religious fluidity. By “spatial boundary crossing,” I mean
the appropriation and use of ostensibly secular spaces by religious groups for religious purposes;
processes that involve religious groups overcoming spatial distinctions in order to accommodate
their growth. As a response to the lack of zoned land for religious purposes, strategies of spatial
boundary crossing enable religious groups to meet their organizational needs, and reflect “the
plethora of religious manifestations which are currently influencing cities worldwide . . . through
informal processes and gray spacing” (Luz 2015:278). This causes religious groups to compete for
space on terms that differ from those prescribed by the state; while the state zones land to minimize
competition between groups of different religions, strategies of spatial boundary crossing enable
religious groups to compete with other, implicitly nonreligious (or secular) agencies for space.
Given that such groups are typically less established than their landed counterparts, spatial
boundary crossing provides a flexible and informal means by which they can accommodate
the early stages of growth. Such strategies and regulatory responses have evolved sequentially;
starting with commercial spaces, then moving to schools and industrial spaces. This progression
was driven by the needs of fast-growing Christian groups, as they needed to juggle the need for
large(r) capacity and cost effectiveness with the increasingly restrictive regulatory environment.
Since the 1980s, churches in Singapore have used commercial premises to hold religious
services. Initially, this involved converting defunct cinemas into churches (Kong 2002), yet,
toward the 1990s, a proliferation of new churches with limited resources saw a shift toward more
flexible arrangements that involved the renting of hotel function rooms and cinema halls instead
(The Straits Times 04.02.07). As the praxis of Christianity within commercial premises became
more commonplace, concerns about the encroachment of religion into the secular domain began
to be voiced. The URA responded in July 2010, issuing new rules for the use of commercial
premises for religious purposes. Based on the notion that the “use of commercial venues for
religious activities should not crowd out the commercial uses and significantly alter the secular
nature of these places” (URA cited in The Straits Times 13.06.10a), the rules were designed
to mitigate against the risk of religious groups dominating commercial space. They included
restrictions on size (less than 20,000 m2 or 20 percent of the gross floor area, whichever is lower),
time (no more than two days per week), and identification (limited use of signage and religious
symbols). In addition, religious groups were warned against causing excessive noise, traffic, or
parking problems, and all must register their use of commercial premises with the URA (The
Straits Times 21.07.10).
In response to the closer regulation (and resulting limitations on capacity), the growing cost of
commercial premises, and the ongoing need to accommodate expanding congregations, Christian
groups started looking for larger and cheaper venues. This involved searching for alternative,
noncommercial spaces that could meet the cost and capacity requirements of Christian groups.
Later in 2010, it was reported that schools were starting to be used for worship as they were
believed to be exempt from the URA’s restrictions, of a suitably large size, and mostly empty
during weekends (The Straits Times 19.09.10a). In response, the URA clarified the rules regarding
the use of schools by religious groups, the most restrictive of which was that only schools built
and managed by religious communities could be used for religious activities (The Straits Times
19.09.10b). As the demand for large, yet cost-efficient and unregulated space continued to grow,
churches then began to emerge in industrial premises. Such premises are considerably cheaper
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than their commercial counterparts, and could be leased under vaguely defined industrial zoning
guidelines that left “the rules open to various interpretations” (The Straits Times 13.02.12).
Subsequently, toward the end of 2012, the URA imposed similar guidelines on the use of industrial
premises as it did on commercial ones. These included limitations on time, size, and religious
identifiers, and the prohibition of industrial premises being exclusively leased or owned by
religious groups (URA 12.06.12). In this case, the restrictions were designed to protect both
the industrial nature of the premises, and the low rents needed by industrial firms to remain
competitive.
Over the years, the interplay between religious praxis and regulatory response has resulted
in the crystallization of guidelines determining how different spaces can and should be used by
religious groups. Thus, while the zoning and regulation of space is one of the main strategies
by which the government strives to control and contain the physical growth and spread of
religious groups in Singapore, such strategies have forced new forms of competitive response
from the fastest-growing and most dynamic religious groups. In this case, therefore, the close
regulation of religious space has caused Christian groups to seek spatial alternatives in the secular
domain; they circumvent the regulations relating to religious space, and find emancipation in
commercial, educational, and industrial spaces instead. The expansion of regulation to cover
the use of ostensibly nonreligious spaces by religious groups foregrounds the reality that in
situations where space is restricted, the relationship between the regulation and praxis of religion
is not determinative (nor dependent), but recursive (and independent) instead. Accordingly, this
also shows how the regulation of religion does not necessarily correspond to the praxis of
religion; in situations where resources are restricted and competitiveness is high, religious groups
are forced into positions where they must reframe the boundaries of “religion” and become
more transgressive players that traverse the religious and nonreligious economies of a given
marketplace.
This game of regulatory cat and mouse is, however, a short-term solution to a much more
pervasive problem. While the strategies of spatial boundary crossing documented above provide
evidence of the extent to which religious groups are willing to make compromises in order to
function and grow, they are unsustainable in the longer term. The fact remains that, in Singapore,
demand for space still (and always will) outstrips supply. On the one hand, the regulation of
space places limitations on capacity, while market forces increase the cost; on the other hand,
growing congregations create a need for larger capacity, which often correlates with the need
to lower costs. With the range of options for religious groups becoming increasingly limited,
alternative strategies have been sought. Notably, this has involved operating as an unregistered—
and therefore unregulated—religious group;7 a strategy that suits many home-grown organizations
that are willing to trade growth for freedom from regulation (The Straits Times 13.06.10b). Others,
however, seek alternative arrangements to navigate the shifting regulatory landscape of Singapore.
Often, this has involved pursuing strategies of organizational boundary crossing.
Strategies of Organizational Boundary Crossing
For larger or well-established religious groups, it is often unfeasible to operate in an unreg-
istered capacity. In such instances, they may change their organizational status (and thus cross
the boundary that separates different “types” of organization) in order to facilitate the process
of acquiring and/or using various premises. Organizational boundary crossing involves religious
groups registering (and operating under, or operating as) businesses or as associations in order
to circumvent the spatial restrictions on religious praxis. Doing so enables religious groups to
7To complement the URAs new guidelines on the use of commercial premises, the government also sought to identify
unregistered religious groups (The Straits Times 29.08.10).
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operate according to the regulatory auspices of the entity that they are registered as (and thus
circumvent restrictions on the religious use of nonreligious space), while continuing to provide
religion-related services. Thus, while strategies of spatial boundary crossing reflect the need for
flexibility in order to accommodate a small but growing organization, strategies of organizational
boundary crossing reflect the desire for spatial fixity to accommodate the needs of a maturing
organization. While the former relates to the leasing of premises on a temporary basis, the latter
relates to the acquisition of land or premises on a more permanent basis. Two case studies illus-
trate the point. The first examines the practice of Buddhist and Taoist organizations operating as
associations, the second examines the practice of Christian organizations operating as businesses.
In both instances, strategies of organizational boundary crossing are driven by the need for access
to larger, or more permanent, sites of religious praxis.
In the first instance, registering as an association provides a channel by which nonreligious
land can be acquired by religious groups. This strategy has proven popular among those with
relatively small and stable congregations, and is exemplified by the relocation of 16 Buddhist
and Taoist temples to Geylang—one of Singapore’s red-light districts, and an area where land
prices were once up to 50 percent lower than surrounding areas—in 2008. While the reasons
for relocating were varied, a commonality is that they were all forced to do so; either because
the government reclaimed a former place of worship, or because they needed a ground-level
premise to accommodate aging congregations, or because of the rising cost of land in more
central locations. Another commonality is that many registered with the URA as associations,
while continuing to operate as places of worship (The Straits Times 20.11.09). While associations
are technically only open to members of the association (not the public, as religious organizations
are), they can still be used for religious purposes as “private worship . . . by members of an
association as an incidental activity, is permissible” (URA, cited in The Straits Times 20.11.09).
Moreover, the religious activities of associations are unregulated by the URA, meaning that
religious groups operating as associations are both more likely to be granted access to land, and
less restricted in their usage of it for religious purposes. For example, the Chong Hood Lim
Temple’s application to build a new temple in Geylang was rejected by the URA in 2008 (citing
zoning laws), but accepted in 2009, when it reapplied as the Chong Hood Lim Association (The
Straits Times 20.11.09).
Associations provide a suitable (alternative) organizational framework for Buddhist and
Taoist groups, as such groups are often well-established, experience minimal (or negative) growth,
and require a permanent physical presence in order to accommodate their religious activities. Such
groups do not typically have congregations that converge on a particular place at a particular time
(and then disband); instead, their activities revolve around place-based shrines that (often small
numbers of) adherents visit at their convenience. Accordingly, their spatial needs differ from
congregation-based Christian groups. They require a fixed and permanent presence that is readily
accessible to visitors; most of them do not require large venues, nor do they need to worry about
the logistical and locational complexity of organizing weekly worship meetings. Registering as
associations enables access to relatively small spaces that provide the spatial fixity and constant
accessibility that Buddhist and Taoist groups require. That said, the growth-oriented nature of
churches has, however, rendered business structures a more viable organizational alternative.
In the second instance, churches have started to incorporate companies so that they can
raise funds and acquire nonreligious premises. The growth of one of Singapore’s largest
megachurches—New Creation Church—exemplifies this strategy. Formed in 1983, it registered
as a church in 1984 and has since grown to an average attendance of 33,000 per week, outgrow-
ing 10 different venues in the process (The Straits Times 13.06.10b). In 1998, it formed Rock
Productions—a management company that looks after a range of businesses that include a retail
center, a travel agency and tour operator, and venue provider—to circumvent zoning restrictions
and rent an auditorium from Suntec City, a multiuse events venue in central Singapore. The
renamed Rock Auditorium had a capacity of 1,400, meaning that the church still had to hold four
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services every Sunday, with services simulcast to a congregation split between the auditorium
and six other venues (The Straits Times 13.06.10b). To better manage its growth and operational
complexity, in 2007, the church announced that it would partner with local property developer,
CapitaLand, to build an integrated civic, cultural, retail, and entertainment hub at Vista Xchange.
Through Rock Productions, the church invested $500 million into the $1 billion development.
Completed in 2012, it now owns and manages the complex’s 38,000 m2 civic and cultural zone,
which includes a 5,000-seat theatre (The Straits Times 16.09.07). Altogether this reflects the en-
croachment of a neoliberal ethos into the religious economy of Singapore, with economic power
foregrounding the right to practice religion.
As both of these examples attest, operating as nonreligious organizations allows religious
groups to circumvent regulatory restrictions on the spatial practices of religious groups. Yet, in
doing so, compromises must be made. Buddhist and Taoist groups operating as associations are
expected to accord to a more privatized, membership-style model, and to relocate to cheaper,
yet less ideal locations. Given the relatively static (or shrinking) size of their congregations,
coupled with their need for a fixed and accessible spatial presence, this is a style of operation to
which they are suited. Christian groups, on the other hand, have more congregation-based (and
therefore, time-specific) worship practices, and thus require larger spaces that can be rented for
short periods of time. Operating as (or alongside) businesses enables them access to a wider
range of spaces that meet such needs. It also gives them more freedom in their choice of location,
and provides complementary revenue streams that can be used to offset the cost of renting
spaces in more central areas. Operating as businesses can, however, place material pressures on
these groups to finance their expansion. This can easily cause the blurring of the boundaries
between religion and business, between spiritual and financial growth, and between the religious
and nonreligious economies. As much as these practices of spatial and organizational boundary
crossing are a competitive response to the regulation of space in Singapore, so too do they reveal
the more nuanced and transgressive ways in which religious marketplaces operate. In particular,
the different strategies employed by Buddhist/Taoist and Christian groups mirror their different
spatial requirements. In these cases, therefore, the unique spatial demands of different religious
groups inform their strategies of spatial acquisition. In turn, as much as such strategies have
helped to shape the evolving regulatory environment in which they operate, so too have they
helped to shape the experience and practice of religion in Singapore.
CONCLUSIONS
Religious economy was formulated nearly 30 years ago as a distinctly American counterpoint
to secularization theory. Since then, it has been validated, critiqued, and expanded through its
application to different religious contexts around the world. This article has sought to continue
such theoretical expansion by reframing the discourse in spatial terms. I have shown how space
constraints in the city-state of Singapore have caused some religious groups to pursue strategies
of spatial and organizational boundary crossing. Such strategies have, in turn, brought about
a shifting regulatory landscape that reflects the recursive relationship between regulation and
religious praxis. The contributions of this article are threefold. One, it has advanced a spatial
perspective to religious economy theorizing. Analyzing the spatial practices of religious groups
provides a window to understanding how the principles of religious economy are interpreted,
applied, and contested in the real world; space thus bridges the gap between theory in its abstract
and applied forms. Two, it has demonstrated how, in the Singapore context, the regulation of
religion is not fixed and unchanging, but is fluid and responsive to the actions of religious groups.
It has therefore highlighted the symbiotic interrelationship(s) between religion and regulation,
and how each shapes the other in the pursuit of desired outcomes. Three, it has challenged one
of the normative principles of religious economy—that regulation reduces competition between
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religious groups—by showing how the regulatory framework of Singapore’s secular monopoly
minimizes the supply of land for religious purposes, and thus increases competition for space.
Beyond these contributions, this article also brings to attention three areas for further study.
The first is specific, and relates to the strategies of reconciliation in contexts where the demand
for space outstrips supply, and how such strategies differ across religious groups. In Singapore,
for example, land sharing agreements have proven to be a successful strategy for managing the
space-related needs of some religions, yet Christian groups have proven resistant to such practices.
The second is more general, and relates to the effects of strategies of spatial and organizational
boundary crossing on the experience of religion. In countries like Singapore, congregations are
challenged to identify with and practice religion in ways that forego the symbolism of religious
buildings, and the security of a fixed location (see Finlayson 2017). How such challenges intersect
with the growth and/or decline, and the congregational structure of, religious groups will help
to generate new perspectives on the applied workings of a religious economy. The third is
theoretical and relates to how informality in religious praxis can be integrated into religious
economy theorizing. It is becoming increasingly clear that “informality is not a separate sector
but rather a series of transactions that connect different economies and spaces to one another”
(Luz 2015:280). Incorporating informality—and associated principles of negotiation, flexibility,
and agency—into our theorizing will help to disrupt the modernist assumptions that underpin
planning principles around the world, and thus pave the way for postmodern understandings
instead.
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